The Jury Redefined: A Review of Burger Court Decisions by Schultz, Marjorie S.
THE JURY REDEFINED:
A REVIEW OF BURGER COURT DECISIONS
MARJORIE S. SCHULTZ*
In the decade since Warren Burger replaced Earl Warren as Chief Justice,
the Supreme Court has decided over thirty cases dealing with the right to jury
trial, redefining the breadth of the right and the composition of a consti-
tutionally-required jury. Section I will examine decisions affecting the right to
trial by jury and illustrate the Burger Court's decision to constrict the right by
refusing to extend jury trials to juveniles or to state civil proceedings, by wid-
ening the category of "petty" offenses to which the right does not extend, by
recognizing a "statutory proceedings" exception to the right in federal civil
suits, and by refusing to make certain landmark decisions apply retroactively.
Section II deals with compositional issues which have been addressed by
the Court in the last ten years such as the size, representativeness, and bias of
juries, and the requirement of unanimous verdicts.
I
THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY
A. Defusing Duncan
The Warren Court's 1968 decision in Duncan v. Louisiana' was a milestone
in the history of the American jury. During the nearly three centuries preced-
ing the case, each state legislature had been free to expand or constrict the
right to jury trial in its state courts, limited only by applicable provisions of
the state's constitution. The Supreme Court in Duncan held that the right to a
jury trial in criminal cases found in the Sixth Amendment is "incorporated"
into the Fourteenth Amendment definition of due process, and thus applies
to the states. Writing for the Court, Justice White reviewed the history of the
jury and concluded that, "in the American States, as in the federal judicial
system, a general grant of jury trial for serious offenses is a fundamental
right, essential for preventing miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair
trials are provided for all defendants."2 He qualified the breadth of the right
* Attorney, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, Texas.
1. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
2. 391 U.S. at 157-58. Incidentally, Justice White has become the foremost spokesman for the
Court on jury issues, having written sixteen majority opinions on the subject since taking his seat
on the Court in 1962. Included are: Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977); Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522 (1975); Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488
(1974); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Bald-
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by stating that waivers are not unconstitutional, nor is "prosecuting petty
crimes without extending a right to jury trial."' These qualifications have
been explored and refined by later Supreme Court decisions.4
The implications of Duncan were far-reaching. The decision seemed des-
tined to bring about a uniform system of criminal justice for the state and
federal courts. This move toward uniformity was not applauded by Justices
Harlan and Stewart, who, in their dissenting opinion in Duncan, saw grave
problems ahead. They saw the states being forced into lockstep conformity
with the federal interpretations of due process-states which might otherwise
serve as laboratories for developing novel solutions to problems within the
criminal justice system but for Duncan. They also saw a potential threat to the
jury as it existed in the federal scheme. Harlan and Stewart favored allowing
the states to adopt their own interpretations of the right to jury trial ex-
pressed in each state's constitution, subject only to a standard of "basic fair-
ness."5 Within their dissent are the seeds of decisions which the Court would
reach in the following decade concerning the extent to which unanimous ver-
dicts, juries of twelve, and impartial jury panels are fundamental aspects of
the right to trial by jury.6
The Burger Court refused to extend the right granted in Duncan to juve-
niles in In Re Burrus and McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,' decided in 1971. There
was no majority opinion, but Justice Blackmun, writing for Burger, Stewart
and White, stated that a juvenile court proceeding is not a criminal prosecu-
tion within the Sixth Amendment, despite the fact that
juveniles over 16 are, in fact, held in the cells of a prison; that counsel and
the prosecution engage in plea bargaining; . . . that the press is generally ad-
mitted in the Philadelphia juvenile courtrooms; . . . that arrest and prior re-
cord may be reported by the press ... ; that, once adjudged delinquent, a ju-
venile may be confined until his majority in what amounts to a prison . . .;
and that the stigma attached upon delinquency adjudication approximates
that resulting from conviction in an adult criminal proceeding. 9
The standard adopted by the court was the fundamental fairness standard
gleaned from prior decisions regarding juveniles t°-the same standard
win v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Dyke %. Taylor
Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Katchen v. Landy. 382 U.S. 323 (1966); and Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202 (1965).
3. 391 U.S. at 158.
4. See text and notes at 13-15, infra.
5. 391 U.S. at 172 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
6. See id. at 181-83.
7. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
8. Id. at 541.
9. Id. at 542.
10. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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proposed by Harlan and Stewart in their Duncan dissent." Harlan, in fact,
concurred in the McKeiver case on the same grounds that had led to his dis-
sent in Duncan. 2 Justice White, author of the Duncan opinion, was sufficiently
convinced of the differences in juvenile and adult proceedings to join the plu-
rality opinion, while Justice Brennan equated admission of members of the
press and public to juvenile trials with the right to jury trial because a certain
amount of protection against "judicial oppression"" may result from exposing
the proceedings to public scrutiny.
The Burger Court further restricted the right to jury trial in 1973 in
Alexander v. Virginia,'4 a suit brought to incorporate the Seventh Amendment
right to jury trial in civil cases into the Fourteenth Amendment. The case is
especially significant because the issue was whether certain materials were ob-
scene, and the Supreme Court had previously enunciated a "community
standards" test" which seemed to indicate that the obscenity question was one
for a jury. The appellants had contended that a state statute providing for a
judicial determination of an obscenity question was unconstitutional. 16 The
Virginia court's affirmance of the judgment that a jury trial is not mandated
in such proceedings was summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court, making
Alexander a definitive statement of the Court's refusal to incorporate the
Seventh Amendment. At present, only the Second and Third Amendments
and the Fifth Amendment right to grand jury indictment stand with the right
to jury trial in civil cases as the Bill of Rights guarantees which do not bind
the states.
B. "Petty" Offenses
Justice White's reference to the petty offenses exception to the right to a
jury trial in Duncan17 relates to such Warren Court decisions as Cheff v.
Schnackenberg,18 Shillitani v. United States,' 9 Bloom v. Illinois,20 and Dyke v. Taylor
Implement Mfg. Co. 2 1 (decided the same day as Duncan), which had generally
delineated the right to jury trial in criminal contempt cases by defining petty
crimes in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 1(3)-those for which the maximum
sentence which can be imposed is no longer than six months (or for which the
actual sentence imposed is six months or less or $500 or both, as in a case like
Bloom where the statute carried no maximum penalty 22 ).
11. 391 U.S. at 172 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
12. 403 U.S. at 557.
13. Id. at 555.
14. 413 U.S. 836 (1973).
15. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
16. 212 Va. 554, 555, 186 S.E.2d 43, 44 (1972).
17. 391 U.S. at 158.
18. 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
19. 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
20. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
21. 391 U.S. 216 (1968).
22. 391 U.S. at 211.
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In 1969, the four members of the Burger Court who also served on the
Warren Court were joined by Harlan in the majority opinion in Frank v.
United States, 23 another criminal contempt case, but this one involved federal
rather than state law. The defendant was given a suspended sentence and
placed on probation for three years. Marshall, writing for the majority, noted
that while probation is "a significant infringement of personal freedom .... it
is certainly less onerous a restraint than jail itself."24 Chief Justice Warren ex-
pressed fear in his dissent that judicial power to place such significant re-
straints on an individual's freedom without a jury conviction could chill the
exercise of constitutional rights by defendants who were members of unpopu-
lar groups or movements, a common phenomena of the late 1960s. 2 Because
a violation of probation could cost the defendant an additional six months in
prison, the Cheff six-month test was compromised by Frank.
The Cheff test, as modified by Frank, was followed by a plurality of the
Court to reverse a conviction for "jostling" which New York had described as
a petty offense and for which the maximum sentence of one year had been
imposed in Baldwin v. New York, 26 but signs of a softening of the test appeared
four years later in Taylor v. Hayes2 7 and Codispoti v. Pennsylvania.28 The de-
fendant in Taylor was sentenced in a post-trial adjudication on multiple
charges of contempt to nine consecutive terms of six months or more. The
sentences were later amended to six-month concurrent terms which were
approved by the Court. 29 Codispoti also involved multiple contempt charges,
but the prison sentences handed down in a post-verdict adjudication aggre-
gated to well over six months. In reversing the sentences, the plurality drew a
distinction between contempt matters which have been dealt with as distinct
and separate charges during the course of a trial and post-verdict adjudica-
tions for which the sentences might aggregate more than six months. The
former were held triable without a jury for the sake of maintaining court-
room order and decorum. 30
In Muniz v. Hoffman,3 t the Court indicated that the $500 fine rule defining
petty offenses for which jury trial need not be accorded defendants is relative,
perhaps to the resources of the particular defendant. The defendant, a labor
union with over 13,000 members, was fined $10,000 for violating a National
23. 395 U.S. 147 (1969).
24. Id. at 151.
25. Id. at 153-55 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
26. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
27. 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
28. 418 U.S. 506 (1974).
29. 418 U.S. at 496. The case was reversed on other grounds: the defendant had been denied
his due process rights of notice and an opportunity to be heard; in addition, the record showed
signs of personal vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing judge. Id. at 496-504.
30. 418 U.S. at 513-15.
31. 422 U.S. 454 (1975).
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Labor Relations Board order against picketing. Again, Justice White wrote for
the majority which decided that the imposition of even so large a fine did not
transform the offense into one for which a jury trial is mandated. 32 In doing
so, the Court left open the question whether a jury trial is ever required in
cases involving a corporate defendant where the only penalty imposed is a
fine.3
3
C. The "Statutory Proceedings" Exception
Three Burger Court decisions explore the effect of the creation of federal
rights by statute upon the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. Curtis v.
Loether 4 was a Title VIII suit for damages resulting from alleged unfair
housing practices. The defendants sought a jury trial but their request was re-
fused. The Supreme Court, in upholding the Court of Appeals reversal, stated
that "when Congress provides for enforcement of statutory rights in an ordi-
nary civil action in the district courts, where there is obviously no functional justifi-
cation for denying the jury trial right, a jury trial must be available if the action
involves rights and remedies of the sort typically enforced in an action at
law." [emphasis added]3 5
This focus on the forum is especially pronounced in the 1977 case, Atlas
Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.3 6 A proceeding
under OSHA3 7 before an administrative law judge resulted in the imposition
of fines, with the collection of those fines enforced in federal district court.
The statute provides that the enforcing court may not retry questions of fact
or propriety of the violation.3 8 Thus, the employer is effectively deprived of
a jury trial on the merits. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that
Congress may create new statutory "public rights" and may provide for
administrative rather than judicial determinations without running afoul of
the Seventh Amendment.39 The opinion distinguished cases involving en-
forcement of private rights, saying that fact-finding by an administrative
agency in such cases will only serve to supplement the jury's function, not to
replace it altogether.4 0
Finally, in Lorillard v. Pons,4 1 a statutory scheme which creates a private
right of action for victims of age discrimination in employment 42 was inter-
32. Id. at 477-78.
33. Id. at 477.
34. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
35. Id. at 195.
36. 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
37. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651-78 (1976).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1976).
39. 430 U.S. at 455.
40. Id. at 450 n.7.
41. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
42. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621-34 (1976), (1970,
Supp. V).
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preted to provide a right to jury trial. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice
Marshall found the necessary congressional intent in the statutory language
authorizing both "legal or equitable relief,"43 the word legal being a term of art
which indicates the right to jury trial is attached to the cause of action.
It now appears that private legal rights created by federal statute and en-
forceable in judicial proceedings carry the right to jury trial, whereas statu-
torily-created public rights may be enforced without jury trials.
D. Waiver of the Right
In United States v. Jackson,44 the Warren Court declared a portion of the
Federal Kidnapping Act 45 to be unconstitutional as an impermissible burden
on the exercise of the right to trial by jury. The Act provided for the death
penalty only if a jury so recommended. By waiving his right to a jury trial, a
defendant could assure no more than a life sentence. Thus, the assertion of
the right to jury trial carried with it the risk of capital punishment. The Court
struck the offending clause but upheld the portion of the Act making kidnap-
ping a federal offense.
41
Two years later, the Burger Court refused to apply the Jackson decision to
overturn a conviction based on the same statute in Brady v. United States.47 In
Brady, the defendant's co-conspirator had confessed and was prepared to tes-
tify for the state, thus giving the defendant added impetus to plead guilty and
waive a jury trial. The Court held that where the offending statute was only a
part of the reason for the guilty plea, the plea could still be held to be "volun-
tarily and knowingly made. '48 "[E]ven if we assume that Brady would not
have pleaded guilty except for the death penalty provision .... this assump-
tion merely identifies the penalty provision as a 'but for' cause of his plea.
That the statute caused the plea in this sense does not necessarily prove that
the plea was coerced and invalid as an involuntary act."'49 Justice White com-
pared the statute's effect to that of plea bargaining in which a guilty plea to a
lesser offense is encouraged in order to avoid trial on the more serious
43. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), quoted in 434 U.S. at 583.
44. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1976).
46. 390 U.S. at 591. The decision inJackson brought a wave of cases before the Court on this
issue of voluntary waiver of constitutional rights. In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459
(1969), the majority read Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 strictly in overturning the guilty
plea of a defendant on a technicality. The defendant had not been addressed personally by the
judge concerning his understanding of the charge to which he was pleading guilty, although he
admitted that he had understood the charge and its consequences at the time of his plea. Chief
Justice Warren cited the serious consequences of a guilty plea, among them, waiver of the right
to jury trial, as the justification for strict compliance with the Rule. Id. at 466.
See also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), in which a guilty plea was reversed because the
record did not indicate whether the judge had ascertained the voluntariness of the plea.
47. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
48. Id. at 745.
49. Id. at 750.
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charge. "We decline to hold ... that a guilty plea is compelled and invalid ...
whenever motivated by the defendant's desire to accept the certainty or prob-
ability of a lesser penalty rather than face a wider range of possibilities ex-
tending from acquittal to conviction and a higher penalty authorized by law
for the crime charged." 50
Two other cases decided with Brady further weaken the impact of Jackson:
McMann v. Richardson5 1 and Parker v. North Carolina52 involved pleas of guilty
following coerced confessions. In upholding the guilty pleas in McMann,
Justice White focused on the role of counsel's advice, saying,
[w]hether a plea of guilty is unintelligent and therefore vulnerable when mo-
tivated by a confession erroneously thought admissible in evidence depends as
an initial matter, not on whether a court would retrospectively consider coun-
sel's advice to be right or wrong, but on whether that advice was within the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.5"
The Brady, McMann and Parker decisions drew sharp criticism from Justice
Brennan, joined by Marshall and Douglas. The dissenters, in interpreting
the Brady opinion, felt the Court had held "that never, except perhaps
in highly unrealistic hypothetical situations, will the constitutional defects
identified in Jackson vitiate a guilty plea. '54 Citing as one of the "grave conse-
quences" accompanying a plea of guilty the "simultaneous surrender" of the
right to a jury trial "with all of its attendant safeguards,' 55 Brennan urged that
the focus of these cases should have been on the governmental action which
served to coerce the pleas (whether by physical threats, promises of leniency,
or by unconstitutional statutory schemes) rather than on the role of the de-
fendants' counsels. "[I]t hardly follows that the support provided by counsel is
sufficient by itself to insulate the accused from the effect of any threat or
promise by the government. 5 6
Justice White's assessment of the constitutionality of the threats and prom-
ises made during the plea bargaining process was recently affirmed in
Bordenkircher v. Hayes.5 7 Here the prosecutor gave the defendant, who had
been convicted of felonies twice previously, the choice between pleading guilty
to a third charge or opting for a jury trial 8 and having a recidivism charge,
which carried a mandatory life sentence, added. Following Parker, Justice
Stewart seems to have forgotten the concerns he so clearly expressed in
50. Id. at 751.
51. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
52. 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
53. 397 U.S. at 770-71.
54. 397 U.S. at 800.
55. Id. at 800-01.
56. Id. at 804.
57. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
58. Id. at 358-59.
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Jackson59 when he states in Bordenkircher that the "discouraging effect" which a
threat of a more serious charge may have upon the "defendant's assertion of
his trial rights" is merely part of the "simple reality" of a judicial system which
allows plea bargaining.
60
Thus, in the decade since Jackson, the case has been reduced to a narrow
holding which will benefit only those convicted to die under the antiquated
Federal Kidnapping Act. Justice Brennan's dissent in Parker v. North Carolina
notes the irony of the situation by comparing the fates of those possibly inno-
cent defendants who were so afraid of the threatened death sentence that
they pleaded guilty or waived their right to a jury trial, and those who were
adjudged guilty and deserving of the death sentence by a jury-only the latter




With the Duncan decision, state and federal requirements for juries
merged, resulting in some significant alterations in the area of jury composi-
tion. Four aspects of this area will be examined: size, unanimity, representa-
tiveness, and bias.
A. Size
The constitutionally-required jury is no longer necessarily made up of
twelve persons. Justice White's opinion in Williams v. Florida6 2 termed the tra-
ditional number of twelve jurors to have been a "historical accident, unrelated
to the great purposes which gave rise to the jury in the first place. 6 3 He went
on to say:
The purpose of the jury trial, ... is to prevent oppression by the Government
.... The performance of this role is not a function of the particular number
of the body that makes up the jury. To be sure, the number should probably
be large enough to promote group deliberation, free from outside attempts at
intimidation, and to provide a fair possibility for obtaining a representative
cross-section of the community. But we find little reason to think that those
goals are in any meaningful sense less likely to be achieved when the jury
numbers six, than when it numbers [twelve]-particularly if the requirement
of unanimity is retained.6 4
The fears expressed by Harlan and Stewart in their Duncan dissent are re-
iterated in their separate opinions in Williams, namely that the "incorporation"
of the right to jury trial into the Fourteenth Amendment would result both in
59. See 390 U.S. at 581-85.
60. Id. at 364.
61. 397 U.S. at 811 n.15.
62. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
63. Id. at 89-90.
64. Id. at 100. The unanimity requirement is discussed at 16-18, infra.
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stifling the creativity of the states in adopting novel solutions to judicial prob-
lems and experimenting in the realm of jury composition while diluting the
federal right to trial by jury in efforts to preserve some flexibility in the state
systems. 65 These fears reached fruition in Colgrove v. Battin66 which extended
the six-member jury concept to the federal courts for suits tried to a jury un-
der the Seventh Amendment.
Finally, in Ballew v. Georgia,67 the line was drawn between five-member
and six-member juries, the former being found unconstitutionally small, at
least for criminal trials. Although all agreed that five jurors were too few,
there was no agreement as to why, as the five separate opinions indicate. The
Blackmun opinion relies heavily on statistics taken from experts' studies of
group dynamics in the field of jury research and concludes that reliability and
representativeness of juries is significantly reduced when the number of ju-
rors is less than six. 68 Powell, joined by Burger and Rehnquist, rejected the
reliance on social science data and merely stated that "a line has to be drawn
somewhere. '69 So, for whatever reason, six are enough while five are not.
B. Unanimity
In DeStefano v. Woods,70 the Warren Court sidestepped the issue of the
constitutionality of nonunanimous verdicts in state criminal trials by refusing
to apply the Duncan case retroactively. The issue was open to question until
1972 when the Burger Court approved less than unanimous verdicts in
Johnson v. Louisiana 71 and Apodaca v. Oregon.
72
In Johnson, the appellant conceded that the Duncan rule did not apply to
his case since it, like DeStefano, arose before Duncan was decided. He therefore
relied on due process and equal protection claims, saying that a conviction by
a less than unanimous jury indicates jurors were not convinced of his guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt. The Louisiana statute provided for conviction by a
majority of nine in cases providing punishment at hard labor while requiring
unanimous verdicts in capital cases. Apodaca involved criminal convictions by
less than unanimous juries after the Duncan decision had been rendered. The
Oregon statute allowed conviction by a majority of ten in noncapital cases.
At the heart of the argument is the question how much deliberation time
is essential for reaching a fair verdict and in the end, whether it is desirable to
render seriously dissenting jurors powerless to hang the jury. With a
65. See 399 U.S. at 117-38 (Harlan, J., dissenting), 399 U.S. at 143-45 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
66. 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
67. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
68. See id. at 232-39.
69. Id. at 246.
70. 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
71. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
72. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
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unanimity requirement, jury deliberation proceeds as long as the trial judge is
convinced there is a possibility that the jury can reach a verdict. But if a
unanimous verdict is not required, can the jury take a vote immediately upon
selecting a foreperson or does the right to jury trial include the right to jury
deliberation as well?
Justice White, writing for the Court, placed his faith in the keen sense of
responsibility felt by jurors when he stated:
We have no grounds for believing that majority jurors, aware of their re-
sponsibility and power over the liberty of the defendant, would simply refuse
to listen to arguments presented to them in favor of acquittal, terminate
discussion, and render a verdict. On the contrary it is far more likely that a
juror presenting reasoned argument in favor of acquittal would either have
his arguments answered or would carry enough other jurors with him to pre-
vent conviction. A majority will cease discussion and outvote a minority only
after reasoned discussion has ceased to have a persuasive effect or to serve
any other purpose-when a minority, that is, continues to insist upon acquittal
without having persuasive reasons in support of its position."
Justice Douglas, with whom Brennan and Marshall joined dissenting, was
not so charitable as to rely on the majority jurors' sense of justice to protect
the right to jury deliberation. He noted that if a necessary majority is reached
on the first ballot, there is no need for deliberation. As a matter of fact, the
verdict in Apodaca was rendered in only forty-one minutes.7 4
In the cojoining of Williams v. Florida75 (jury of less than twelve) and
Johnson and Apodaca, Douglas saw a "parade of horribles"-convictions by a
three-to-two majority or even two-to-one, followed, perhaps, by the elimina-
tion of the presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.7 6
Some of these fears were put to rest recently in Burch v. Louisiana, 7 where the
Court drew another line over which the states may not step when it held that
five-to-one verdicts violate a defendant's rights under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion used the rea-
soning some had employed in Ballew7s (invalidating five-person juries),
namely that the line must be drawn somewhere. Since Ballew held that a
unanimous verdict by a jury of five is not valid, the invalidation of a five-to-
one verdict from a jury of six follows logically.
A question which remains unanswered is the extent to which compositional
requirements for juries in state and federal trials must coincide. AfterJohnson
and Apodaca, state courts are free to allow nonunanimous verdicts while fed-
eral courts are not. The Brennan dissent in Johnson points out that a majority
73. 406 U.S. at 361 (1972).
74. Id. at 389 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
75. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
76. 406 U.S. 393-94 (Douglas, J.. dissenting).
77. 441 U.S. 130 (1979).
78. 435 U.S. 223 (1978). See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
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of the Court felt that federal juries must render unanimous verdicts while
states may validate non-unanimous ones; a different majority agreed that the
Sixth Amendment right applies to state and federal trials in an identical fash-
ion.719 This inconsistency has yet to be resolved.
C. Representativeness
The extent to which a jury pool should represent a cross section of the
community has been clarified in the past decade in decisions involving racial,
sexual and philosophical representativeness.
1. Race
Systematic exclusion of members of one race from a jury pool was held
unconstitutional in Swain v. Alabama8 ° in 1965, but the defendant had the
burden of proving the exclusion had occurred. Then in 1967, the Court held
that gross disparity between the percentage of blacks in a community and the
percentage of blacks in a jury pool creates a prima facie case of unconsti-
tutional systematic exclusion, and places the burden on the state to explain
the discrepancy.8
In Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene County,8 2 qualified black jurors who
had never been called to serve sought an injunction to prevent further sys-
tematic exclusion of blacks from the jury pool. The discussion of the
plaintiffs' standing to sue implies that qualified citizens have a right to be con-
sidered for jury service. 83 The states were held to have the right to impose
such reasonable qualifications on potential jurors as they wish, but racial con-
siderations were held to be unreasonable. 84 As to whether jury commissions
must be racially representative, the Court stated, "The appellants are no more
entitled to proportional representation by race on the jury commission than
on any particular grand or petit jury. 85
Finally in Castaneda v. Partida,8 6 the Court recognized that systematic ex-
clusion from grand juries (as evidence by a gross discrepancy in the compo-
sition of the community and the composition of jury pools) of an ethnic
79. 406 U.S. at 395 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
81. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24 (1967); and Sims v.
Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967).
82. 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
83. Id. at 329-30.
84. The remedy cited with approval by the Court was the construction of a new jury roll. 396
U.S. at 340 n. 46.
85. Id. at 339. Timing of a challenge to grand jury composition has been held all important,
first in Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973) (challenge to a federal grand jury selection
process), and then in Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) (challenge to a state grand jury
selection process), both cases holding that a collateral attack is too late.
86. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
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minority, Mexican-Americans, is unconstitutional. Presumably, such exclusion
from petit juries will also be held invalid.
2. Sex
A Florida statute which systematically excused women from jury service
was upheld in Hoyt v. Floridas7 in 1961, Stewart and Brennan joined in the
majority opinion. But fourteen years later, an identical Louisiana statute was
struck down in Taylor v. Louisiana,88 again Stewart and Brennan joined the
majority. Although Taylor was a male, the Court ruled that he had standing
to challenge the statute since it was his right to a jury pool consisting of a fair
cross section of the community that was threatened by the operation of the
statute. 89
Louisiana argued that many women would face special hardship if called
for jury duty, and that the state would be faced with the administrative bur-
den of sorting out those who could serve. The statute thus shifted the burden
to women; they were required to file a letter with the clerk of court re-
questing that their names be added to the jury list if they wished to serve.
Justice White stated:
It is untenable to suggest these days that it would be a special hardship for
each and every woman to perform jury service or that society cannot spare
any women from their present duties. This may be the case with many, and it
may be burdensome to sort out those who should be exempted from those
who should serve. But the task is performed in the case of men, and the
administrative convenience in dealing with women as a class is insufficient jus-
tification for diluting the quality of community judgment represented by the
jury in criminal trials. 90
... [A] flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded. The exclu-
sion of one [sex] may indeed make the jury less representative of the commu-
nity than would be true if an economic or racial group were excluded. 9'
One week later, however, the Court limited the Taylor rule by declaring
that it was not to be applied retroactively to decisions obtained by juries im-
paneled prior to the Taylor decision. The per curiam opinion in Daniel v.
Louisiana92 cited DeStefano9 3 as controlling. Only Justice Douglas protested the
inequity of the Court's accepting one of many cases raising this issue and giv-
ing relief only to the individual appellant by a prospective rather than a retro-
active decision. 94 The same day Taylor was limited, the Court decided Test v.
87. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
88. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
89. Id. at 526. The right was inferred from the Carter decision, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970), and
from Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
90. 419 U.S. at 534-35.
91. Id. at 532 (quoting from Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946)).
92. 420 U.S. 31 (1975).
93. 392 U.S. 631 (1968). See text and notes at 16, supra.
94. 420 U.S. at 33-34. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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United States9 5 in which a federal statute, the Jury Selection and Service Act of
1968,96 was interpreted to give a litigant an unqualified right to inspect jury
lists for signs of any defects in the selection process and to use the lists in
preparing challenges to the jury selection procedure.
3. Capital-punishment Qualified
The issue whether a defendant who is tried on a capital charge has a right
to a jury pool from which those opposed to the death penalty have not been
systematically excluded was raised in 1968 in Witherspoon v. Illinois.9 7 An
Illinois statute allowed the prosecution in a capital case to challenge for cause
any juror who "state[s] that he has conscientious scruples against capital pun-
ishment, or that he is opposed to the same."9' In Witherspoon, the prosecution
had successfully challenged over half of the veniremen because of their gen-
eral objections to the death penalty. Only five of the forty-seven challenged
stated that under no circumstances could they agree to recommend the death
sentence.
99
Justice Stewart, noting that a growing proportion of the American public
no longer supports the imposition of capital punishment, discussed the effect
of the exclusion of that group from juries in capital cases:
A man who opposes the death penalty, no less than one who favors it, can
make the discretionary judgment entrusted to him by the State and can thus
obey the oath he takes as a juror. But a jury from which all such men have
been excluded cannot perform the task demanded of it .... [A] jury that
must choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment call do little
more-and must do nothing less-than express the conscience of the commu-
nity on the ultimate (juestion of life or death. Yet, in a nation less than half of
whose people believe in the death penalty, a jury composed exclusively of
such people cannot speak for the community. Culled of all who harbor doubts
about the wisdom of capital punishment-of all who would be reluctant to
pronotce the extreme penalty-such a jury can speak only for a distinct anddwindling minority.("'
In the years following Witherspoon, the Burger Court refused to limit it to pro-
spective application and remanded several cases in light of Witherspoon.'"'
The strongest affirmation of the Witherspoon standard came in 1976 in
Davis v. Georgia, ° 2 a case in which only one "death-scrupled juror" 10 was ex-
95. 420 U.S. 28 (1975).
96. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-74 et seq. (1976).
97. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
98. Id. at 512.
99. Id. at 514.
100. Id. at 519-20.
101. In Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 (1969), Stewart quoted Witherspoon, saying, "The
most that can be demanded of a venireman . . . is that he be willing to consider all the penalties
provided by state law." id. at 482, and in Maxwell v. Bishop. 398 U.S. 262 (1970), a 1962 rape
conviction was remanded because the jury selection process violated Witherspoon.
102. 429 U.S. 122 (1976).
103. Id. at 122.
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cluded wrongly from the panel. There was nothing on the record to indicate
systematic exclusion of conscientious objectors. Nevertheless, the convic-
tion was reversed and remanded, the Court saying, "if a veniremen is improp-
erly excluded even though not [committed to vote against the death penalty
before the trial has begun], any subsequently imposed death penalty cannot
stand."
0 4
The limits of Witherspoon were defined in 1978 by the decision in Lockett v.
Ohio.1 0 5 There it was decided that the exclusion of prospective jurors who
made it "unmistakably clear" that they could not hear the case impartially be-
cause of their objections to the death penalty was proper. "Nothing in Taylor
• . . suggests that the right to a representative jury includes the right to be
tried by jurors who have explicitly indicated an inability to follow the law and
instructions of the trial judge."' 0 6
A representative jury, then, may be composed completely of one race or
gender, so long as other races and genders are not systematically excluded,
but the state bears the burden of explaining the disproportionate composition
of the pool. A jury in a capital case must not exclude those who voice general
objections to the death penalty, but may properly exclude those who indicate
that their verdict will be influenced by the possible death sentence to such an
extent that they could not hear the case impartially.
D. Bias
1. Pretrial Publicity
The Warren Court found pretrial publicity to be so prejudicial in a num-
ber of cases as to cause convictions to be invalidated. 0 7 The most notable of
these cases were Estes v. Texas' 0 8 and Sheppard v. Maxwell.10 9 In Estes, television
coverage of the trial, in and of itself, was held sufficiently unfair to invali-
date this conviction 1 ' and "Dr. Sam" Sheppard's trial was called a "Roman
holiday.""'1 The Sixth Amendment rights of defendants were held to domi-
nate the First Amendment rights of the media.
The Burger Court qualified the holdings in Estes and Sheppard to some
extent in the cases of Murphy v. Florida"' and Dobbert v. Florida." 3 The em-
phasis has been shifted from pretrial publicity to the "totality of the circum-
stances" with the "circus atmosphere" being the culprit rather than the
104. Id. at 123.
105. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
106. Id. at 596-97.
107. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); and Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
108. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
109. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
110. 381 U.S. at 544-50.
111. 384 U.S. at 356.
112. 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
113. 432 U.S. 282 (1977).
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pretrial knowledge of the jury, gleaned from the media publicity.1 14 "[Q]uali-
fled jurors need not . . . be totally ignorant of the facts and issues in-
volved."115 Quoting from Irvin v. Dowd, "It is sufficient if the juror can lay
aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence
presented in court."'"1 6 If the judge obtains the juror's assurance that he can
be impartial, then "it remains open to the defendant to demonstrate ... such
hostility by the jurors who served in his trail as to suggest a partiality that
could not be laid aside." ' 7
The Estes and Sheppard decisions rested not on showings of hostility but
merely on the opinion of the Court that impartiality must have been impossi-
ble under the prevailing circumstances. The Murphy and Dobbert decisions put
a much greater burden on the defendant to demonstrate impartiality in fact
due to media coverage or other pretrial factors.
2. Racial Prejudice
The defendant in Ham v. South Carolina"'8 was convicted of a drug-related
offense in a jury trial. Ham was well-known in his small South Carolina com-
munity because of his civil rights activities, and he claimed that the drug
charge was a frame by the police who were "out to get him."' 19 During the
voir dire, the judge refused to ask any questions directed at identifying possi-
ble racial prejudice among members of the jury panel. The Supreme Court re-
versed Ham's conviction on the grounds that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed a defendant the right to select a fair and
impartial jury.
The holding was based in part on a 1931 case, Aldridge v. United States,1 20 a
federal case in which the defendant was a black man being tried for the mur-
der of a white policeman. His conviction was reversed because of the trial
judge's failure to interrogate the jury concerning their possible racial preju-
dice. The Aldridge holding was not based on Constitutional grounds, but
rather on the "essential demands of fairness."' 2 1 Justice Rehnquist's opinion
in Ham raised the issue to a constitutional level by stating that, "one of the
purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to in-
sure the 'essential demands of fairness.' 1122
The Ham case seemed to enunciate a broad rule constitutionally requiring
the asking of questions aimed directly at racial prejudice if that issue was re-
114. See 421 U.S. at 799; 432 U.S. at 302.
115. 421 U.S. at 799-800. For a discussion of the merits of using knowledgeable jurors, see
generally, Hassett, A Jury's Pre-trial Knowledge in Historical Perspective: The Distinction Between Pre-trial
Information and "Prejudicial" Publicity, 43:4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 155 (1980).
116. 421 U.S. at 800 (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961)).
117. Id.
118. 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
119. Id. at 525.
120. 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
121. Id. at 310.
122. 409 U.S. at 526.
[Vol. 43: No. 4
Page 8: Autumn 1980]
lated to the facts of a case. The holding was narrowed considerably, however,
in Ristaino v. Ross, 1 23 a state case with facts nearly identical to those of
Aldridge. The case arose before Ham was decided, and Justice White would
have limited Ham to prospective application,' 24 but the majority went much
further and restricted Ham to its facts. Justice Powell, reciting Ham's civil
rights activities, concluded that, "Racial issues ... were inextricably bound up
with the conduct of the trial" because the defendant's reputation and his de-
fense (that of being framed by the police) "were likely to intensify any preju-
dice that indivual members of the jury might harbor.' 1 25 "The mere fact that
the victim of the crimes alleged was a white man and the defendants were Ne-
groes" was not enough in the minds of the Court to cause the issue of racial
prejudice to rise to a constitutional level.'12 Just what would be enough, short
of the facts of Ham, is an open question.
Justice White's position would have squared with DeStefano v. Woods' 27 and
Daniel v. Louisiana 2 " and would have preserved the Ham rule for all future
cases. The rule was easy to follow-it mandated questions regarding racial
prejudice whenever there was an element of racial conflict associated with a
case, and the rule cost little in judicial efficiency. Instead, the Ristaino majority
chose to muddy the waters by announcing the "inextricably bound" test which
is difficult for lower courts to apply and which will doubtless call for further
interpretation by the Supreme Court. Marshall and Brennan, both of whom
dissented in Ham because they felt the Court had not gone far enough in
requiring questions about a whole range of possible prejudice, called the deci-





The Burger Court's posture on jury issues has generally been one of re-
trenchment. Except in the area of jury representativeness, the Court has
modified or limited earlier decisions granting greater access to jury trials and
it has significantly weakened the functional utility of a jury by its decisions re-
garding the number of jurors and unanimity.
Only on the representativeness question has the Burger Court made prog-
ress by expanding a party's rights to have a case heard by a jury which more
closely reflects the composition of his community. An important issue yet to
be heard by the Court is the extent to which age should be considered when
looking for a representative jury. Whether the Court will be willing to make
further progress in this area is a question for the 1980s.
123. 424 U.S 589 (1976).
124. Id. at 599 (White, J., concurring).
125. 424 U.S. at 597.
126. Id.
127. 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
128. 420 U.S. 31 (1975).
129. 424 U.S. at 599 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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